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The Relation Between Human Rights Law and 
the Law of Belligerent Occupation: Does an 
Occupied Population Have a Right to Freedom 
of Assembly and Expression? 
by John Quigley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Human rights law assumes universality. The law of belligerent occupation 
gives considerable flexibility to an occupant. The two bodies of law appear to 
be on a collision course. This article analyzes the rights of assembly and ex-
pression of a population under military occupation. It attempts to determine 
whether human rights law or occupation law prevails. While human rights law 
provides broad scope to assembly and expression, occupation law requires only 
application of the law of the displaced sovereign and imposes severe restrictions 
on occupants. Assembly and expression thus are good examples of the signifi-
cance of the issue of which body of law prevails. 
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
When the law of belligerent occupation was formulated, human rights law 
did not exist. Even in 1949, when the most important treaty in belligerent 
occupation was adopted, the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, usually referred to as the Fourth Geneva Convention,l 
human rights law had not advanced beyond a United Nations Charter obligation 
to observe human rights2 and the United Nations General Assembly's Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.3 By the 1980s, however, many states had 
* Professor, College of Law, Ohio State University. The author is grateful to Owen Davies. Barrister. 
Middle Temple, London, for assistance with information for preparation of this article. 
I Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949,75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
, U.N. CHARTER arts. I. 55. 56. 
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217. U.N. Doc. Al81D at 71 (1948) [hereinafter 
Universal Declaration]. 
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accepted human rights law via treaty, and many important rights entered into 
customary internationallaw.4 
There are four possible solutions to the problem of whether human rights 
law or occupation law prevails. First, human rights law might apply concurrently 
with occupation law. This argument is that human rights law applies in wartime 
as well as in peacetime, and that when occupation law was formulated, universal 
norms of human rights were not considered. The Fourth Geneva Convention 
protects only a few human rights. The Hague Regulations, the other major 
treaty on the law of belligerent occupation, requires an occupant to apply the 
law in force at the commencement of the occupation.5 That was an appropriate 
solution at a time when no universal standards of conduct of states vis-it-vis 
individuals existed. It is an anachronistic solution, however, at a time when 
universal standards have become accepted as conventional and customary law. 
A second possible solution is that human rights law does not apply in occupied 
territory. Human rights law was formulated to regulate peacetime situations, 
while occupation law was devised for belligerent occupation. The two bodies of 
law are thus aimed at different situations. An occupant must observe the law in 
force at commencement of the occupation (the law of the displaced sovereign), 
but not the universal standards of human rights law. 
A third possible solution is a variation of the second position. This solution 
views human rights law as a law of universal applicability but maintains that 
occupation law temporarily displaces it in times of belligerent occupation. 
A fourth possible solution is that human rights law applies during military 
occupation, not through its own force, but as part of the law in force at the 
commencement of the occupation. To the extent that human rights law is 
customary international law, it is in force in the territory at the commencement 
of the occupation. The displaced sovereign may have adhered to human rights 
treaties. Under the domestic law of the displaced sovereign, the treaties may 
constitute domestic law. But even if they do not, the displaced sovereign had 
an obligation to enforce them, and thus those norms were part of the law of 
that territory. 
III. THE CLAIM TO UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Norms of human rights law appear to apply universally. In a report on human 
rights in armed conflict, the Secretary-General of the United Nations construed 
the United Nations Charter's human rights provisions to apply in wartime: 
4 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture committed by a state agency prohibited 
by customary international law). 
5 Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex: Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306. See also 1 BEVANS, 
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 
631 (1968) [hereinafter HAGUE REGULATIONS). 
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[T]he human rights provisions of the [U.N.] Charter make no dis-
tinction in regard to their application as between times of peace on 
the one hand and times of war on the other .... These texts seem 
to cover all persons living in countries which are at peace as well as 
inhabitants of countries engaging in, or affected by, armed conflicts. 
The phraseology of the Charter would ... encompass persons living 
under the jurisdiction of their own national authorities and persons 
living in territories under belligerent occupation.6 
3 
The Secretary-General also construed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights to apply during wartime: 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not refer in any 
of its provisions to a specific distinction between times of peace and 
times of armed conflict. It sets forth the rights and freedoms which 
it proclaims as belonging to "everyone," to "all," and formulates 
prohibitions by the phrase that "no one" shall be subjected to acts 
of which the Declaration disapproves. The Declaration proclaims 
that the "universal and effective recognition and observance" of the 
rights and freedoms shall be secured.7 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a more specific 
statement of human rights law, does provide for exceptional situations, which 
is an indication that it is to apply in wartime. It permits a state party to proclaim 
a "public emergency" in a situation that "threatens the life of the nation," so 
long as no discrimination is made "on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin."8 It lists certain provisions from which no derogation 
is possible even during an emergency.9 Provisions on freedom of assembly and 
speech are not immune to derogation. IO 
This "public emergency" exception does not specifically mention wartime or 
military occupation. Specific mention of wartime in the "public emergency" 
proviso appeared in a draft of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. That mention, however, was deleted to avoid acknowledging the possi-
bility of war. As reported by the Secretary-General: 
When the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was 
being prepared by the Commission on Human Rights, earlier drafts 
of what now is article 4 of that Covenant provided that derogations 
from the obligations of States Parties should be admissible "in time 
6 Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, 24 U.N. GAOR (No. 61), 
U.N. Doc. AJ7720 at 12, para. 23 (1969) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report 1969]. 
71d. at 12, para. 24. 
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,6 
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 368 (entered into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter International Covenant]. 
9 Jd. at art. 4, 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 370. 
10 Jd. 
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of war or other public emergency" or "in time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the interests of the people." In the course 
of the proceedings in the Commission on Human Rights it was 
recognized that one of the most important public emergencies was 
the outbreak of war. It was felt, however, that the Covenant should 
not envisage, even by implication, the possibility of warY 
The fact that participating states sought to provide for the possibility of partial 
derogation in wartime indicates that they viewed human rights as being appli-
cable in wartime. 
The "public emergency" provisos in the European and American regional 
human rights treaties provide explicitly for partial derogation in wartime. The 
European Convention provides that "[i]n time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation" derogation is permitted "to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation."12 The American Convention allows 
partial derogation "in time of war, public danger, or other emergency that 
threatens the independence or security of a State Party ... to the extent and 
for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."13 
These derogation provisions indicate that state signatories intend for human 
rights norms to apply in wartime. 14 
IV. THE LAW OF MILITARY OCCUPATION AS A POTENTIALLY EXCLUSIVE LAW 
Occupation law texts provide human rights protection on only a few matters. 
They prohibit the following human rights violations: violence against civilians; 15 
adverse distinctions based on race, color, sex, language, religion or belief, po-
litical or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, 
II Secretary-General Report 1969, supra note 6, at 13, para. 26. For text of the drafts using the phrase 
"in time of war or other public emergency," see M. BossuYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 81-82 (1987). For a Human Rights 
Commission explanation confirming the Secretary-Genera!'s analysis of the reason for omission of a 
reference to war, see id. at 86. 
12 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 
15,213 V.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
"American Convention on Human Rights, art. 27, Organization of American States, Official Records, 
OEA/ser. K.lXVI.Il.l, doc. 65 rev. I, corr. 1 (1970) (cited in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 673, 683) 
(entered into force June 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]. 
14 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is silent on emergency situations, but in 
article 61 it appears to incorporate rules of general human rights law as found in universal and 
regional instruments. This interpretation construes the Charter consistently with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention, and the American Convention. 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 59, 67 
(cited in 7 HUM. RTS. L.J. 403) (1986) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter]. 
15 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note I, at art. 27. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), June 8, 1977, art. 75 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
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or on any other similar criteria; 16 physical or psychological torture; 17 failure to 
respect religious practices;18 and collective punishment. 19 Occupation law texts 
also provide a variety of guarantees to persons charged with crime.20 An occu-
pant's general power with respect to legislation is set by article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations, which states: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the 
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his 
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
civil life, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
force in the country.21 
This provision makes the scope of rights applicable in an occupied territory 
dependent on what they were prior to commencement of occupation. It sets no 
universal standard. Thus, if the displaced sovereign severely circumscribed 
freedom of assembly and speech, the occupant could lawfully circumscribe 
them. This provision further permits derogation from laws in force in the 
interest of public order and safety, but it requires an occupant to observe laws 
in force in pursuing that aim "unless absolutely prevented." 
Occupation law texts do not refer to human rights law, either to incorporate 
it or to reject its applicability. But the 1977 Protocol I, in its article enumerating 
human rights protections, includes the following as a final paragraph: "No 
provision of this Article may be construed as limiting or infringing any other 
more favourable provision granting greater protection, under any applicable 
rules of international law .... "22 This reference apparently includes human 
rights law because that is the body of law that provides protection to individuals. 
V. RELATION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
AND OCCUPATION LAW: VIEWS OF WRITERS 
Pictet argues that human rights law does not apply to military occupation: 
[H]umanitarian law is valid only in the case of armed conflict while 
human rights are essentially applicable in peacetime, and contain 
derogation clauses in case of conflict. Moreover, human rights gov-
ern relations between the State and its own nationals, the law of war 
those between the State and enemy nationals. There are also pro-
16 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 27; Protocol I, supra note 15, at art. 75. 
17 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 31-32; Protocol I, supra note 15, at art. 75. 
18 Protocol I, supra note 15, at art. 75. 
19 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 33; Protocol I, supra note 15, at art. 75. 
20 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 64-78; Protocol I, supra note 15, at art. 75. 
21 HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 43. 
22 Protocol I, supra note 15, at art. 75. 
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found differences in the degree of maturity of the instruments and 
in the procedure for their implementation. The Geneva Conven-
tions are universal and of a mandatory nature. This is certainly not 
the case with human rights instruments. The system of supervision 
and sanctions also differs. Thus the two systems are complementary, 
and indeed they complement one another admirably, but they must 
remain distinct, if only for the sake of expediency. In case of war, 
only a neutral and non-political body has any chance of access to 
the scene of hostilities and ensure protection for the victims. This 
is true of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
the real 'spearhead' of the Geneva Conventions. Likewise with the 
effort to develop humanitarian law: its only chance of success lies 
in its being carried on, as far as possible, outside the sphere of 
politics. 23 
Pictet's major argument is based on expediency. He argues that implementation 
and enforcement differ for the two bodies of law. This is not a reason to deny 
the applicability of human rights norms in wartime or during military occupa-
tion, a situation which is neither fully wartime nor peacetime either. To the 
extent that Pictet's arguments have validity, their validity is less for military 
occupation than for periods of hostilities. 
Cohen agrees with Pictet and stresses Pictet's point that the enforcement 
mechanism for the two bodies of law is different. Human rights enforcement 
is politicized, whereas humanitarian law enforcement is objective: 
[TJhe ICRC as the mainstay of the law of armed conflicts has main-
tained its distinct, impartial character, detached from political strug-
gles. Only this body can ensure that the protection of human rights 
in armed conflicts will not fall prey to the blight of politicisation 
.... Consequently, a distinction must be made between the inter-
relationship of the two bodies of law, the law of human rights and 
the law of armed conflicts, and the exploitation of this interrelation-
ship by politically oriented bodies.24 
Meyrowitz shares Pictet's view that the two bodies of law are different, though 
his reasons go less to implementation than to the nature of the relations regu-
lated. Meyrowitz addresses specifically the situation of military occupation; he 
argues that it is not susceptible to regulation by human rights law because the 
relation between the occupied population and the occupant is one of hostility, 
and therefore not comparable to a peacetime situation: 
[TJhe situation of fact and law of a population of an occupied territory 
casts light on the contrast with the domestic public law relation 
23 J. PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 15 (1975). 
24 E. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967-1982, at 9 (1985). 
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supposed by human rights. With the sovereignty of the occupied 
state, the occupation allows the duty of loyalty of the nationals to 
remain. Also, between the occupied persons and the occupants there 
can be no political or societal association, still less any sort of com-
munity. The law of the occupant-"martiallaw" as it was called until 
recently-and "military government" do not require the consent of 
the occupied persons; but they [the occupied persons] must not 
compete with it [the law of the occupant]. Their practical and moral 
existence must be, to transpose the famous word of Renan, an 
everyday plebiscite against the occupant .... What is more, the duty 
of obedience is quite precarious, since the occupied persons have 
the right to military resistance, if they meet the conditions stated in 
article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention.25 
7 
Meyrowitz's statement of the differences between the relation of an occupied 
population to an occupying power, and of a population to its government in 
peacetime, is correct. The law of military occupation presupposes hostility. But 
that law also requires an occupant to permit life to proceed as normally as 
possible, save for the necessities of maintaining control. 26 ·Moreover, human 
rights law also presupposes a difference of interest between a government and 
the population it controls. The government desires to maintain itself in power, 
while the population desires to avoid repression. There would be no need for 
human rights law if hostility between the government and the population did 
not exist. If it is true that an occupied population has a right to revolt, the same 
is true of a peacetime population vis-a.-vis its government; revolt within a state 
is not forbidden by international law. Thus, the difference that Meyrowitz sees 
as fundamental is in reality one of degree. There is no reason why human 
rights law cannot apply in military occupation any more than in peacetime. 
Most scholars disagree with Pictet, Cohen, and Meyrowitz, and find human 
rights law applicable in wartime. Robertson, one of the early exponents of that 
view, writes: "[H]umanitarian law is one branch of the law of human rights ... 
[and] human rights afford the basis for humanitarian law."27 He states that 
"[h]uman rights law relates to the basic rights of all human beings everywhere, 
at all times; humanitarian law relates to the rights of particular categories of 
25 Meyrowitz. Le droit de fa guerre et fes droits de l'homme, 88 REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE 
POLITI QUE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER 1059, 1098-99 (1972) (emphasis in original). Meyrowitz refers 
to the Third Geneva Convention, which is the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949,75 V.NT.S. 135. See art. 4(A) of this convention for a definition of the require-
ments for prisoner of war status. 
26 See HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 43. See also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 
1, at arts. 47-78. 
27 A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 174 (1972) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS); see also 
Robertson, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET 793,797 (C. Swinarski ed. 1984). 
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human beings-principally, the sick, the wounded, prisoners of war-in partic-
ular circumstances, i.e. during periods of armed conflict."28 Robertson states 
that human rights law provides protection on certain topics not covered by 
humanitarian law, while humanitarian law provides protection on certain topics 
not covered by human rights law.29 He contends that the two bodies of law 
complement each other.30 
Draper, too, regards human rights law as universal in its application: 
[I]f armed conflict breaks out, whether inter-State or intra-State, 
that regime [of human rights law] does not dissipate. First, it is there 
waiting in the background the whole time, to take over once the 
conflict abates. Second, a different and exceptional regime, namely 
that of the law of war, a lower level of the human rights regime but 
part of it, comes into playas a series of derogations made necessary, 
and strictly necessary, by the conflict situation .... That which 
cannot be strictly allowed by the conflict stands to be condemned to 
the extent it violates the regime of human rights. 31 
Many organizations and writers maintain that human rights law and occu-
pation law apply together. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the 
agency primarily responsible for enforcement of occupation law, views human 
rights law as applying along with occupation law.32 Calogeropoulos-Stratis finds 
that the two bodies of law complement each other: "[T]he two laws are two 
crutches on which the individual may lean to avoid-insofar as is possible-the 
disastrous consequences of armed conflict."33 Partsch identifies certain issues on 
which the two bodies of law reach different results but finds that human rights 
law is recognized as supplementing occupation law.34 Gros Espiell considers the 
two to operate together: "The individual can be considered protected by both 
systems of norms. In situations not regulated by international humanitarian 
law, all human beings are protected by the international law of human rights."35 
28 Robertson, supra note 27, at 797. 
29/d. at 798. 
30Id. at 802. 
31 Draper, The Relationship between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of Armed Conflicts, 1 ISR. Y.B. 
ON HUM. RTS. 191, 198 (1971). 
32 The Red Cross and Human Rights, Int'l Committee Red Cross Doc. CD17I1I1, at 113, 116 (\983) 
(working document submitted to the Council of Delegates, Provisional Agenda Item 7, Geneva, Sept. 
1983). 
33 Calogeropoulos-Stratis, Droit Humanitaire-Droits de {'Homme et Victimes des Con flits Armes, in STUDIES 
AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN 
PICTET 655,661 (C. Swinarski ed. 1984). 
34 Partsch, La Protection Internationale des Droits de {'Homme et les Conventions de Geneve de la Croix-
Rouge, 26 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 73, 83 (1974). 
35 Espiell, Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados, 
in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR 
OF JEAN PICTET 699, 706 (C. Swinarski ed. 1984). 
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This view is similar to state practice, which recognizes the applicability of 
human rights law in wartime, and specifically during military occupation. That 
state practice is reflected in litigation arising under the European human rights 
convention and in proceedings of the United Nations which considered the law 
relating to military occupation. 
VI. RELATION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
AND OCCUPATION LAW: CASE LAW 
In the only two cases to raise the issue, the European Commission of Human 
Rights has decided that human rights law applies during military occupation. 
In Cyprus v. Turkey, filed after Turkey occupied a portion of Cyprus in 1974, 
Cyprus alleged that Turkey committed a variety of human rights violations in 
that territory. Cyprus cited several articles of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that it claimed Turkey 
had violated. Both states are parties to that Convention. Turkey denied that it 
was in military occupation, on the grounds that a new government had been 
established in the portion of Cyprus in question, and that Turkey did not 
exercise control there. 
The Commission found Cyprus' application admissible and decided that Tur-
key did exercise control as a military occupant. Turkish forces, it said, had 
"entered the island of Cyprus, operating solely under the direction of the 
Turkish Government and under established rules governing the structure and 
command of these armed forces including the establishment of military 
courts. "36 The Commission cited article One of the European Convention, which 
renders states-parties responsible for human rights "to everyone within their 
jurisdiction."37 It stated that this article means "that the High Contracting Parties 
are bound to secure the said rights and freedoms to all persons under their 
actual authority and responsibility, not only when that authority is exercised 
within their own territory but also when it is exercised abroad."38 
Turkey did not argue that the Fourth Geneva Convention takes precedence 
over human rights norms; rather, Turkey asserted the position that it was not 
in military occupation. Cyprus argued that human rights norms were applicable. 
The Commission agreed. Cyprus v. Turkey has been characterized as "a significant 
recognition in principle of the applicability of international human rights law 
to occupied territories."39 
36 Cyprus v. Turkey, 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 85 (1979) (decision on admissibility), reprinted in 62 Int'l 
L. Rep. 75, at para. 21 (1982). 
" European Convention, supra note 12, at art. I. 
38/d. at 74. 
39 Roberts, What Is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 287 (1985) (citing 62 Int'l L. 
Rep., 5-10, 82-83 (1982)). 
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The Commission reached the same conclusion in a previous case, Hess v. 
United Kingdom. 40 Rudolf Hess had been incarcerated in Spandau Prison, Berlin, 
for World War II crimes against peace. His wife petitioned for his release. The 
United Kingdom was one of four states in joint military occupation of Berlin. 
The Commission decided that the U.K. was not responsible for Hess' incarcer-
ation under article One of the European Convention, but only because of the 
quadripartite character of the occupation: 
The commission is of the opinion that the joint authority cannot be 
divided into four separate jurisdictions and that therefore the 
United Kingdom's participation in the exercise of the joint authority 
and consequently in the administration and supervision of Spandau 
Prison is not a matter "within the jurisdiction" of the United King-
dom, within the meaning of Art. 1 of the Convention.4! 
The Commission said "that there is in principle, from a legal point of view, 
no reason why acts of the British authorities in Berlin should not entail the 
liability of the United Kingdom under the Convention."42 Thus, though it found 
that the quadripartite character of the occupation relieved the U.K. of respon-
sibility, the Commission considered the European Convention to cover its actions 
while in military occupation of foreign territory. 
In neither Cyprus v. Turkey nor Hess v. United Kingdom did the Commission 
discuss the interplay between human rights law and occupation law. Evidently, 
it did not consider such a discussion necessary to its conclusion that the Euro-
pean Convention applies. 
VII. RELATION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND OCCUPATION LAW: 
PRACTICE OF STATES REFLECTED IN UNITED NATIONS WORK 
United Nations reports, resolutions, and decisions on military occupation 
show a state practice consistent with that of the European Commission of 
Human Rights. The U.N. General Assembly (Assembly) affirmed in a near-
unanimous resolution the applicability of human rights law to armed conflict: 
"Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in 
international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed con-
flict. "43 
40 Hess v. U.K., 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 72, 74 (1975) (decision on admissibility). 
41 !d. at 74. On the U.K. view of the status of Berlin, see Observations of the Government of the United 
Kingdom on the Admissibility of Application No. 12816187 Lodged by George Vearncombe and Others Against 
the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, sec. 2, (1987) (available from author or European 
Commission of Human Rights). For a view that U.K. powers are broader than those of a military 
occupant, see I.D. HENDRY & M.C. WOOD, THE LEGAL STATUS OF BERLIN 35-36 (1987). 
42 Hess, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 73. 
43 G.A. Res. 2675, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). The vote was 
109 to 0, with 8 abstentions. 
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The Assembly has referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
providing law applicable in military occupation. In establishing a committee to 
monitor human rights in territories occupied by Israel in 1967, the Assembly 
stated that it was "[g]uided by ... the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."44 
In the same resolution, it cited the Fourth Geneva Convention.4s The Assembly 
evidently considered both bodies of law applicable to the occupied territory. It 
referred to no conflict between them and to no need to limit human rights 
norms in light of the Fourth Geneva Convention.46 
In a resolution calling on Israel to accept recommendations made by that 
monitoring committee, the Assembly asked Israel "to comply with its obligations 
under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various international organiza-
tions."47 Again, the Assembly evidently considered the belligerent occupant to 
be under an obligation to observe both the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
human rights law. 
After conducting a study mandated by the Assembly, the Secretary-General, 
too, found human rights law to apply in wartime: "[T]he human rights provi-
sions of the [United Nations] Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights apply both in times 
of peace and in times of war and armed conflicts."48 He found, referring to the 
United Nations Charter, that "[t]he phraseology of the Charter would ... en-
compass persons living under the jurisdiction of their own national authorities 
and persons living in territories under belligerent occupation."49 The Secretary-
44 Respect for and Implementation of Human Rights in Occupied Territories, G.A. Res. 2443, preambular 
para. 1,23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 50, U.N. Doc. A17218 (1968). 
45Id. at preambular para. 2. 
46 See Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: Report of the Secretary-General, 25 U.N. GAOR Annex 
III at 122-23, U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970) (statement of Yugoslavia that norms found in human rights 
treaties and General Assembly resolutions "set forth the basic principles governing the protection of 
human rights in times both of peace and of war") [hereinafter Secretary General Report 1970]. The 
report also contains "[r]eplies received by the Secretary-General from member states regarding the 
preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII)." 
Id. at 122-23, para. 10. See also U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979, 
at 760-68 (1980). In this, one in a series of annual reports on human rights in states receiving U.S. 
aid, the State Department applies to the territories under military occupation by Israel the same 
standards it applies to peacetime states, reflecting a view that human rights norms apply in military 
occupation. On the view of the Palestine Liberation Organization, see Palestine National Assembly 
Research Center, Palestine Liberation Organization, Israeli Violations of Human Rights in tM Occupied 
Territories: The Case Before the United Nations 6 (1975), ("[t]he civilian persons in the occupied territories 
... enjoy the rights provided for in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.") 
47 G.A. Res 2727, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/8028, para. 2 (1970). 
48 Secretary-General Report 1970. supra note 46, Annex I: "General Norms Concerning Respect for 
Human Rights in Their Applicability to Armed Conflicts," at 87, para. 3. 
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General considered as reflective of state practice Security Council Resolution 
237, adopted following the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, which appeared to con-
template the applicability of human rights norms in wartime: 
The principle that human rights shall be protected not only in peace 
time but also under conditions of armed conflict was significantly 
repeated more recently by the Security Council when, in its reso-
lution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, it stated that "essential and 
inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vi-
cissitudes of war."50 
The Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, like the General 
Assembly, has referred to both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the Fourth Geneva Convention in calling upon Israel to refrain from certain 
actions in territory it occupied in 1967.51 The Commission stated that 
[I]n accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations and those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Member States bear a special responsibility to ensure the protection 
of human rights and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights 
and in the dignity and worth of the human person.52 
The reference to the Charter is evidently to its provisions on human rights-
articles I, 55, and 56. The Commission has also referred to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a document by which it is "guided" in 
assessing the situation in the Arab territory that Israel has occupied since 1967.53 
The fact that U.N. bodies consider human rights law applicable in occupied 
territory is consistent with the history of the United Nations development of 
human rights law. The United Nations promoted human rights law in part 
because of the atrocities committed on occupied territory during World War 
II: 
The prominence given to human rights in the Charter was the 
consequence of the appalling atrocities and degradations inflicted 
by the Nazi regime on the Jews of Europe and on peoples of the 
occupied territories. The motive behind its provisions was the desire 
to prevent any recurrence of such outrages upon humanity by mak-
49 Secretary-General Report 1969, supra note 6, at 12, para. 23. 
50Id. at 15, para. 31. 
51 Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Territories Occupied as a Result of Hostilities in the Middle 
East, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1195 (1972). 
52Id. at preambular para. 4. 
53 Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN .4/1987 IL.4, at preambular para. 2 (1987). 
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ing the preservation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual everywhere a matter of international concern to every 
State. 54 
VIII. PRIOR DOMESTIC LAW VERSUS AN INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
13 
If human rights did not apply in military occupation, one significant conse-
quence would be that an occupant would have to apply the law of the displaced 
sovereign regardless of its content. This would mean that states in the situation 
of the World War II victors coming into occupation of Germany would have 
been required to apply laws discriminating against Jews. One commentator who 
finds that occupation law prevails, in general, over human rights law, concedes 
that in such a situation an international minimum standard is found in state 
practice: 
[B]ecause the fundamental structures of society found by Allied 
occupiers during World War II were so far below generally accepted 
minimum standards of civilization that enforcing those structures 
would itself have been a violation of international law, recent state 
practice appears to have established an exception to those rules 
when the occupying power is faced with a local system that is anath-
ema to the minimum standards of civilization. 55 
The Allies in post-War Germany suspended National Socialist criminallegisla-
tion deemed to fall below the international minimum standard. 56 They sus-
pended laws that discriminated on the basis of race or religion, even though 
the pre-1949 law of occupation provided no protection from such discrimina-
tion.57 "In so exceptional a situation," writes Schwarzenberger, "compliance with 
the standard of civilisation may ... make unavoidable the exercise of the oc-
cupant's legislative powers for the double purpose of destroying the legal foun-
dations of such a barbarous system and restoring a minimum of civilised life in 
the occupied territory."58 
54 Waldock. Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of the European Con-
vention. INT'L & COMPo L.Q. I (Supplemental Publication No. I I) (1965) (emphasis added). 
55 Goodman, The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1573, 1590 (1985). 
56 G. VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY; A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 115 (1957). 
57 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW As ApPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRI-
BUNALS 195 (1968). 
58 Id. 
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IX. IMPLICATIONS FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND EXPRESSION: 
THE ApPROACH THROUGH OCCUPATION LAW 
In the areas of freedom of assembly and expression, reliance on human rights 
law or occupation law produces sharply different approaches to the rights of 
individuals. Occupants have imposed severe restrictions on freedom of assembly, 
speech, and the press, on the theory that public order and safety is threatened 
by activities and publications evidencing hostility to the occupant. 59 
Fauchille, writing at the end of World War I, cited substantial restrictions on 
the press during the German occupation of France during 1870-1871, during 
the German occupation of Belgium in 1914, and during the Allied occupation 
of Germany under the Armistice of 1918.60 He found a great latitude in law 
for an occupant: "It [the press] is for it [the occupant] a grave danger. The 
occupant has the right to restrict freedom of the press, to suppress it and to 
forbid publication of newspapers. The current usages of war leave to the con-
queror complete freedom of action."61 
More recent writers on military occupation, also citing practice prior to the 
development of human rights law, find authorization in occupation law for 
broad restrictions. According to Von Glahn: 
Most writers as well as military manuals permit severe restrictions 
on the freedom of the press, suspension or closing of newspapers, 
and even imprisonment of journalists on the grounds that such 
control will tend to lessen materially the spirit of opposition in the 
native population and will aid in the suppression of news items of 
military importance. Dispatches dealing with any aspect of the war 
or of the occupation, and particularly stories hostile in tone to the 
occupying authorities, are subject to strict censorship.52 
Von Glahn finds authorization as well for prohibitions on import of publications 
containing material hostile to the occupant,53 on hostile radioltelevision com-
munication,54 and on public meetings of a political character.55 
Greenspan also finds broad restrictions on the press permissible: 
Obviously the circumstances of a military occupation do not allow 
for freedom of the press. The occupant is not required to observe 
existing laws regarding the press; he may impose a censorship on 
59 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 56, at 139-41; 2 P. FAUCHILLE, TRAlTt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
247 (1921); M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 223 (1959). 
60 P. FAUCHILLE, supra note 59, at 247-48. 
61 Id. at 247. 
62 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 56, at 139. 
63 !d. 
64 Id. at 139-40. 
65Id. at 140. 
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it, may prohibit it entirely or prescribe regulations for publication 
and circulation especially in unoccupied parts of the country and in 
neutral countries.66 
15 
The United States Army manual on land warfare follows that approach: "The 
belligerent occupant may establish censorship of the press, radio, theater, mo-
tion pictures, and television, of correspondence, and of all other means of 
communication. It may prohibit entirely the publication of newspapers or pre-
scribe regulations for their publication and circulation."67 
Israel's occupation since 1967 of the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan 
Heights has given rise to issues of freedom of assembly and expression in 
military occupation. Israel's courts have followed the military occupation law 
and have ignored human rights law. In a prosecution for violation of the Order 
(No. 101) Prohibiting Hostile Sedition and Propaganda (West Bank Region), 
which permits extensive restrictions on expression and assembly, the Supreme 
Court of Israel stated: "[N]o doubt has been cast on the capacity of the military 
administering authority to restrict or even totally prohibit political activities in 
administered territory; and, in any event, it is empowered to resort to criminal 
law sanctions against those who infringe the prohibition."68 
In a case in which the military government banned a periodical, the Supreme 
Court of Israel made a similarly categorical statement about the power to 
suppress. The Court stated that "[t]he duty to ensure safety and public order 
... vests in the military government, inter alia, the authority to prohibit political 
activities and to limit or even prohibit political publications, and the opinion of 
jurists of international law on that point is c1ear."69 
X. IMPLICATIONS FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND EXPRESSION: 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ApPROACH 
By contrast, human rights law provides broad protection for assembly and 
expression. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has 
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association."70 "Everyone has the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
66 M. GREENSPAN, supra note 59, at 233. GREENSPAN, The Protection of Human Rights in Time of Warfare, 
1 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 228, 238 (1971). 
67 U.S. Dept. of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare (Field Manual 27-1O) 144 (1956). 
68 Arnon v. Attorney General, High Court of Justice No. 507172, 27(2) Piske; Din 233, 237 (1973), 
English translation from ISRAEL NATIONAL SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, 
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 77 (1981) [hereinafter ISRAEL NATIONAL 
SECTION]. Summary of case (not including this language) in 9 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 334 (1979). 
69 ISRAEL NATIONAL SECTION, supra note 68, at 78 (quoting AI-Talia Weekly Magazine v. Minister of 
Defence, High Court of Justice No. 619178, 33(3) Piskei Din 505, 510 (1979». 
70 Universal Declaration, supra note 3, at art. 20. 
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opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."7l 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affords broad pro-
tection to assembly and expression: "The right of peaceful assembly shall be 
recognized."72 In addition, it states: 
Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference 
.... Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression: this 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing 
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his 
choice.73 
The European and American conventions similarly provide broad protection 
to assembly and expression. The European Convention states: "Everyone has 
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with 
others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection 
of his interests."74 "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers."75 
The American Convention protects assembly and expression: "The right of 
peaceful assembly, without arms, is recognized."76 "Everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, re-
ceive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
medium of one's choice."77 
Additionally, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,78 
which is used by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as a document 
binding on states who are members of the Organization of American States, 
protects assembly and speech. The Declaration states: "Every person has the 
right to assemble peaceably with others in a formal public meeting or an infor-
mal gathering, in connection with matters of common interest of any nature."79 
71 !d. at art. 19. 
72 International Covenant, supra note 8, at art. 21. 
73 Id. at art. 19. 
74 European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 11. 
75 International Covenant, supra note 8, at art. 10. 
76 American Convention, supra note 13, at art. 15. 
77 Id. at art. 13, para. I. 
78 This declaration is found in the Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American 
States, Bogota, May 2, 1948. For full text, see I. BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 381 
(1981). 
79 American Convention, supra note 13, at art. 21. 
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"Every person has the right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the 
expression and dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever."8o 
The African Charter provides for freedom of assembly: "Every individual 
shall have the right to assemble freely with others."81 "Every individual shall 
have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law."82 As to 
expression, the Charter provides: "Every individual shall have the right to 
receive information. Every individual shall have the right to express and dis-
seminate his opinions within the law."83 
The universal and regional norms provide for three exceptions to protection 
of freedom of expression and assembly. These exceptions are: (1) where exercise 
of the freedom threatens national security or public order; (2) where rights are 
exercised in a way that would negate protected rights; and (3) in time of a 
declared public emergency. These three exceptions will now be considered. 
A. Exception for National Security and Public Order 
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there is no language in the 
provisions limiting assembly and expression. A separate proviso, however, per-
mits a state to limit any of the Declaration's enumerated rights: "In the exercise 
of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic soci-
ety."84 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains no such 
proviso of general applicability, but includes limitations applicable specifically 
to assembly and expression. As regards assembly, the Covenant states: 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other 
than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are nec-
essary in a democratic society in the interest of national security or 
public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection' of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.85 
80 !d. at art. 4. See also application in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Exercise and Regulation 
oJ Freedom oJ Expression in Costa Rica: Compulsory Membership in a ProJessional Association oJ Journalists: 
Schmidt Case. reported in 6 HUM. RTS. L.J. 211, 216 (1985). 
81 African Charter, supra note 14, at art. 11. 
82 Id. at art. 10. 
M3 !d. at art. 9. 
R4 Universal Declaration, supra note 3, at art. 29. 
85 International Covenant, supra note 8, at art. 21. 
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As regards expression, the Covenant provides: 
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore 
be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are 
provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or 
reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or 
of public order (ordre public), or of p!-lblic health or morals.86 
The European Convention also permits limitations on expression and assem-
bly. As to expression: 
The exercise of these freedoms ... may be subject to such formal-
ities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.87 
As to assembly, the European Convention states: 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other 
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.88 
The American Convention on Human Rights contains similar limitations on 
assembly and expression. Expression 
shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to sub-
sequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established 
by law to the extent necessary to ensure: (a) respect for the rights 
or reputations of others; or (b) the protection of national security, 
public order, or public health or morals.89 
In addition, expression 
may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the 
abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio 
broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination 
86Id. at art. 19. 
8' European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 10. 
88Id. at art. II. 
89 American Convention, supra note 13, at art. 13. By way of exception, public entertainment is 
subject to prior censorship for the moral protection of children. See Uf. at art. 13. 
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of information, or by any other means tending to impede the com-
munication and circulation of ideas and opinions.90 
Assembly, in the American Convention, may be limited as follows: 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other 
than those imposed in conformity with the law and necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety 
or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights 
or freedoms of others.9! 
19 
In addition, the American Convention contains a proviso imposing a limitation 
on all its enumerated rights: "The rights of each person are limited by the 
rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general 
welfare, in a democratic society."92 
The African Charter of Human and People's Rights permits the right of 
assembly to be limited as follows: "The exercise of this right shall be subject 
only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in 
the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and free-
doms of others."93 It contains no limit applicable to the right of expression but 
does, unlike the European and American conventions, include a separate chap-
ter headed "Duties" that limits an individual's rights enumerated in the Charter. 
One such duty is that "[t]he rights and freedoms of each individual shall be 
exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality 
and common interest."94 An individual also has a duty "not to compromise the 
security of the State whose national or resident he is."95 
The European Court and the European Commission of Human Rights have 
interpreted this exception in a number of cases. The Court permitted the 
Netherlands to limit publications hostile to it written by a member of the armed 
services. In that case Dutch servicemen had written and circulated articles critical 
of and disrespectful towards superior officers.96 The Court stated that "[t]he 
proper functioning of an army is hardly imaginable without legal rules designed 
to prevent servicemen from undermining military discipline, for example by 
writings."97 In another case the European Commission permitted Austria to 
prohibit a planned meeting by a group promoting pan-Germanism and a 
90Id. at art. 13. 
91 Id. at art. 15. 
92Id. at art. 32. 
93 African Charter, supra note 14, at art. 11. 
94Id. at art. 27. 
95Id. at art. 29. 
96 Case of Engel and Others, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R, 22 (ser. A) (1976). 
97Id.at41. 
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merger between Austria and Germany. The Commission concluded that the 
meeting might endanger public security.98 
In a number of cases, however, the European Commission and the Court 
have upheld freedom of expression against an assertion by a state that suppres-
sion of speech was necessary. The European Court explained in one case that 
a restriction on speech must be "necessary;" the Court stated that while "nec-
essary" is "not synonymous with 'indispensable,' neither has it the flexibility of 
such expressions as 'admissible,' 'ordinary,' 'useful,' 'reasonable,' or 'desirable' 
and that it implies the existence of a 'pressing social need."'99 So stating, the 
Court found that it was not necessary for the United Kingdom to prohibit 
publication of a news article on a matter under litigation (the safety of thalid-
omide), where the U.K. Attorney General had secured a court injunction against 
publication on the grounds that the publication would cause public prejudgment 
of an issue pending in court. 100 
The European Commission found that a prohibition against a Nazi collabo-
rator on all publication activity was an abuse of the national security exception. 
The Commission implied that had the prohibition related to publication on 
public affairs topics only, "national security" might have provided a justifica-
tion. IOI 
The European Commission found that press censorship in Greece that for-
bade criticism of the governing military junta was not justified as a limitation 
"necessary in a democratic society for any purposes in paragraph (2) of article 
10."102 The junta's press order had instituted "preventive censorship of all sorts 
of printed matter put into circulation."103 The order prevented "publication of 
any piece of information, comment, picture or cartoon, tending to vilify the 
general policy of the National Government, the constitutional order, and to 
sabotage the internal and external security of the country."I04 Specifically pro-
hibited was any item containing insult to the Government, or any item which 
"in the opinion of the (Press Control) Service damages the task of the Govern-
ment." The order prohibited notices of leftist organizations such as reports 
from the Communist Party radio station. As subsequently relaxed, the order 
permitted publication of items appearing in the foreign press critical of the 
Government. 105 Thus, the Commission considered that controls on hostile press 
comment were not permitted. 
98 A. Association and H. v. Austria, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 187, 193 (1984) (decision on admissibility). 
99 Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 35, 36 (ser. A) (1979). 
100 [d. at 42. 
101 De Becker Case, 1962 Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (ser. A). 
102 Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. 164 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.). 
10'ld. at 160. 
I04Id. 
105Id. 
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The Commission found a colorable case that Germany had invalidly invoked 
the exception to article 10 (though it did not clarify which exception) in the 
case of a public school teacher dismissed for allegedly failing to dissociate herself 
from the German Communist Party. The Commission found the complaint 
admissible on two grounds, as a violation of freedom of expression and as an 
absence of justification under article 10, paragraph 2.106 
B. Exception Where Right Is Invoked to Promote Negation of Rights 
A second exception to protection is one stated in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant states that no person may use 
enumerated rights to "perform any act aimed at the destruction of any rights 
and freedoms" contained in that Covenant. 107 The European Convention con-
tains a similar exception, expressed in article 17: 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 
set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the Convention. lOB 
The European Commission found inadmissible a complaint by the German 
Communist Party objecting that the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
had declared the Party illegal. The Party invoked articles 10 and 11 of the 
European Convention. The Commission addressed the case under article 17 
and reasoned that the Party sought to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, 
which the Commission said would negate rights secured by the Convention. 109 
The American Convention provides one additional exception to freedom of 
expression: 
Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or 
religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to 
any other similar illegal action against any person or group of 
persons on any ground including those of race, color, religion, 
language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punish-
able by law. 110 
106 X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 30 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 132, 143 (1983) (decision on admis-
sibility). 
107 International Covenant, supra note 8, at art. 5. 
lOB European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 17. 
109 German Communist Party v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1959 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 222 (decision 
on admissibility) (decisions for 1955, 1956, 1957). 
110 American Convention, supra note 13, at art. 13. 
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C. Exception for Public Emergency 
In recognition of exceptional situations, human rights law contemplates the 
possibility of derogation from certain human rights norms. The International 
Covenant and the European and American conventions allow for declaration 
of a "public emergency."lll The public emergency exception must be found to 
exist on objective criteria. A state that has declared an emergency is entitled to 
a "margin of appreciation" in assessment of the seriousness of the threat,ll2 but 
the state bears a burden of proof to demonstrate conditions justifying the 
declaration. ll3 
The European Court found that a "public emergency" existed in the Republic 
of Ireland in 1956-1957. The government had taken extraordinary measures 
after declaration of an emergency. The Court recounted that there was in 
Ireland "a secret army engaged in unconstitutional activities and using violence 
to attain its purposes; ... that this army was also operating outside the territory 
of the State, thus seriously jeopardising the relations of the Republic of Ireland 
with its neighbour." The Court also cited "the steady and alarming increase in 
terrorist activities from the autumn of 1956 and throughout the first half of 
1957."114 The Court defined "public emergency" as "an exceptional situation of 
crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat 
to the organised life of the community of which the State is composed.""5 
The European Commission found no "public emergency" in Greece in 1967 
after the governing military junta declared a state of siege. The junta asserted 
that a government takeover by insurgents was imminent, but the Commission 
found no evidence to substantiate that claim. The junta relied on street dem-
onstrations and labor strikes, but the Commission did not find their scope 
extraordinary. The Commission found no "public emergency" though it con-
ceded that Greece had experienced "political instability and tension, ... an 
expansion of the activities of the Communists and their allies, and ... some 
public disorder."116 The Commission took the position that for a "public emer-
gency" there must be an imminent threat to the existing order, not merely the 
possibility that the current situation might be leading to such a threat. 
I J J See supra text accompanying notes 8-14. 
112 Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. at 72; Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International 
Covenants on Human Rights of December 1966, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN R,GHTS: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH NOBEL SYMPOSIUM, OSLO, SEPTEMBER 25-26, 1967, at 103, 116 (A. Eide & 
A. Schou eds. 1968); Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 281, 
297-301 (1976-77). 
JJ3 Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. at 72. 
114 "Lawless" Case, 1961 EUf. Ct. H.R. 56 (ser. A). 
liS Id. 
116 Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. at 73-75. 
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The three exceptions to protection for assembly and expression do not swal-
low up those rights. Despite the exceptions, the protections afford considerable 
latitude in assembly and expression. It remains now to ascertain the applicability 
of the indicated standards in the context of military occupation. 
XI. ASSEMBLY AND SPEECH IN MILITARY OCCUPATION 
The above recitation of state practice indicates that human rights law is 
applicable in armed conflict, including military occupation. The practice is 
recent because human rights law only developed after 1945. The United Nations 
took interest in application of human rights law to wartime only in 1968. 
Customary norms of international law, however, may form in a short time.1!7 
State practice reflected in the United Nations is consistent on this point, and in 
the only two cases to arise under the European Convention, the European 
Commission decided that an occupant is bound to observe human rights law. liS 
The position that existed prior to development of human rights law-that an 
occupant may suppress all hostile speech and assembly-has given way to a 
norm calling for protection of freedom of assembly and speech. 
Even apart from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, an 
obligation to respect freedom of assembly and expression is found in customary 
law. State practice beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and the American Declaration of the Rights of Man, reflects a view that states 
are not at liberty to suppress assembly and expression at will. The United States 
finds that states accept human rights law as binding apart from treaty obligation: 
There now exists an international consensus that recognizes basic 
human rights and obligations owed by all governments to their 
citizens. This consensus is reflected in a growing body of interna-
tional law: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and other in-
ternational and regional human rights agreements. There is no 
doubt that these rights are often violated; but virtually all govern-
ments acknowledge their validity.llg 
Most, perhaps all, of the provisions of the Universal Declaration have been 
accepted as customary law. The United Nations General Assembly has fre-
117 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal Republic 
of Germany v. Netherlands), 1969 I.C.]. 42-43. 
[[8 See Cyprus v. Turkey. 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 85 (1979) (decision on admissibility), reprinted in 62 
Int'I L. Rep. 75, at para. 21 (1982); Hess v. U.K., 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 72 (1975) (decision on 
admissibility). 
[[9 U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 46, at I. 
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quently referred to the Declaration as binding. 120 The Declaration has exerted 
considerable influence over the constitutions of many states. 121 "This constant 
and widespread recognition of the principles of the Universal Declaration," 
concludes one author regarding the deference shown the Declaration, "clothes 
it, in my opinion, in the character of customary law."122 Even if not every 
provision of the Declaration is accepted as customary law, the most basic rights, 
like freedom of assembly and expression, are so accepted. 
States may also be obliged to grant freedom of assembly and expression by 
virtue of membership in the United Nations. The binding character of the 
Charter's human rights provisions is disputed, since the Charter does not ex-
pressly oblige states-members to observe human rights. But the Charter does 
oblige the organization to "promote ... universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."123 The Charter also obliges 
states-members to "take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Or-
ganization" for the achievement of that purpose.124 
Oppenheim concludes that "[t]here is, in basic constitutional instruments such 
as the Charter, probably no room for reasoning ... that although one of the 
objects of the United Nations is to promote respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, its members are not under a duty to respect and observe 
them."125 While the Charter does not enumerate rights, 
[t]he absence of a definition of these rights and of provisions for 
their enforcement, far from detracting from the obligatory nature 
of these articles, imposes upon the members a moral-and, however 
imperfect, probably a legal-duty to use their best efforts, either by 
agreement or, whenever possible, by enlightened action of their own 
judicial and other authorities, to act in support of a crucial purpose 
of the Charter. 126 
Under occupation law, an occupant must follow the domestic law of the 
displaced sovereign on freedom of assembly and expression. An occupant may 
120 Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 33 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1979); 
Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 813, 816 
(1978); Waldock, supra note 54, at 15. See also Final Act, Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (Helsinki Accords), Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Declaration on Principles Guid-
ing Relations Between Participating States, Aug. I, 1975, art. 7, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 
(agreement to "act in conformity ... with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"). 
121 Waldock, supra note 54, at 14. 
122 !d. at 15. 
123 U.N. CHARTER art. 55. 
124Id. at art. 56. 
125 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 739-40 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955). 
126 !d. at 740. 
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derogate these freedoms if "absolutely necessary" for public order and safety.127 
If the displaced sovereign has strong protection of assembly and expression, 
the situation resulting from the application of substantive law does not differ 
substantially from that resulting from the application of human rights law. 
Human rights law, however, provides an additional enforcement mechanism. 128 
If the displaced sovereign's standard is low, then the standard of protection of 
human rights law will raise the level of rights applicable to the occupied pop-
ulation. 
The broad protection of assembly and expression found in human rights law 
applies in military occupation. This prohibits prior censorship of publications, 
understood by the states drafting the International Covenant to be precluded 
by the Covenant's formulation of protection of speech. 129 The right to assembly 
includes a right to form and join trade unions. 13o 
As for the exceptions, the situation is more complex. The national security! 
public order exception, and the exception for actions that would lead to negation 
of protected rights, apply in military occupation. In the case of the national 
security!public order exception, an occupant typically faces a hostile population. 
The hostile population may heighten the risk to public order from hostile 
assembly or speech. Other governments, however, may face a hostile population. 
There is no reason in principle why this exception should apply differently in 
a situation of military occupation. Moreover, hostility is not always found, as 
for example, with the post-World War II occupation of Berlin. 
It is questionable whether the "public emergency" exception can apply in 
military occupation. It would be difficult to demonstrate imminent threat since 
the territory of occupation is separate from (though possibly contiguous to) the 
territory of the occupant. If there is serious disorder in occupied territory, that 
may pose a threat to the occupier's continued control, but not necessarily to the 
occupying state itself. In construing a similar provision in the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Court of 
Human Rights indicated that the emergency must threaten the entire nation. I3I 
In one case, however, the European Court found a "public emergency" al-
though the threat existed only in a portion of the territory of the state in 
question. In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the United Kingdom had declared an 
emergency in the part of the United Kingdom known as Northern Ireland. 
The United Kingdom did not declare an emergency in, or allege a threat to, 
any other portion of the United Kingdom. The Court did not address the 
12i HAGUE REGULATIONS, supra note 5, at art. 43. 
128 See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
12" M. BOSSUYT. supra note II. at 398-99. 
130 International Covenant. supra note 8. at art. 22. 
131 "Lawless" Case, 1961 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 56. 
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question of the territory in which the threat existed. Instead, the Court decided 
the entire issue in a single paragraph: 
article 15 [of the European Convention] comes into play only 'in 
time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation.' The existence of such an emergency is perfectly clear from 
the facts summarised above ... and was not questioned by anyone 
before either the Commission or the Court. The crisis experienced 
at the time by the six counties therefore comes within the ambit of 
article 15. 132 
The Court, by its reference to "the six counties," which means Northern Ireland, 
acknowledged that the emergency existed there only. One commentator noted 
that "it is very hard to see that the situation really threatens the life of the whole 
nation. The reality seems to be that, for purposes of article 15, 'the whole 
nation' is simply Northern lreiand."133 
This case seems wrongly decided, a situation which may be explained by the 
fact that Ireland did not argue the point, so that the Court's attention was not 
directed to it. Preparatory documents of the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission leading to finalization of the emergency clause in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights indicate that the phrase "public emer-
gency which threatens the life of the nation" means "life of the nation as a 
whole."134 
An emergency cannot be claimed by an occupant that has come into occu-
pation by aggression. The negotiating history of the International Covenant 
indicates that the intent was to deprive a state that had created an emergency 
situation from claiming an emergency by committing aggression. Therefore, 
the International Covenant permits derogation of guaranteed freedoms "pro-
vided that such measures are not inconsistent with the other obligations [of 
states-parties] under internationallaw."135 
Apart from the question of whether an alleged threat affects the entire nation, 
it must still be determined whether circumstances warrant a finding of "public 
emergency." An occupant might contend that military occupation constitutes a 
continuing emergency. But military occupation alone does not suffice. As in a 
nonoccupancy, non-war situation, the state must demonstrate imminent 
threat. 136 Military occupation does not necessarily involve a situation of emer-
132 Case of Ireland v. United KingdDm, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 78 (ser. A) (1978). 
I33 Higgins, supra note 112, at 302. 
134 M. BOSSUYT, supra note II, at 86. 
135 International Covenant, supra note 8, at art. 4. For the negotiating history see M. BOSSUYT, supra 
note 11, at 89. 
136 Greek Case, 1969 YB. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. at 75. 
1989) HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 27 
gency. A state may come into military occupation without hostilities. 137 Even if 
the occupation is a result of hostilities, the situation following termination of 
hostilities is not necessarily a "public emergency." If it is decided that a "public 
emergency" exists in occupied territory; restrictions on assembly and expression 
must nonetheless be based on actual necessity. States may derogate rights during 
a public emergency ohly "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situatitJn."138 
XII. ADVANTAGES OF SIMULTANEOUS ApPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
OCCUPATION LAW 
Applicability of human rights law does not negate the law of military occu-
pation. The latter continues to provide the most basic rights, particularly those 
relating to protection from physical harm. But human rights law applies as well. 
It provides an additional enforcement mechanism for those rights that overlap 
in the two bodies of law. For the rights found only in human rights law, but 
not in occupation law, human rights law provides the sole protection, apart 
from the domestic law of the displaced sovereign. 
Occupation law and human rights law are enforced by different mechanisms. 
Occupation law is enforced by a "protecting power" or by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, operating confidentia:lly in cooperation with the 
occupant. 139 Human rights law is enforced by a reporting system, by United 
Nations investigation, and by regional commissions and courts. 140 Both enforce-
ment systems are weak. 141 For that reason; it is efficacious that the two operate 
simultaneously.142 In a particular situation, one may gain compliance more 
effectively than the other. 143 
The two enforcement mechanisms operate in different ways: "The mecha-
nism of humanitarian law has a preventive character, while that of human rights 
has a corrective character."144 Humanitarian law seeks to convince the dccupant 
to comply, while human rights law leads to a finding of past violation. This 
137 Eide. The Laws of War and Human Rights-Differences and Convergences, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET 675,680 
(C. Swinarski ed. 1984). 
13. Secretary-General Report 1969, supra note 6, at 14. On the practice of common-law states in public 
emergencies, see Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights fry National Courts during Periods of 
Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1-65 (1984). 
139 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note I, at arts. 9, 10, 142, 143. 
140 For a comparison of the enforcement of the two bodies of law, see Eide, supra note 137, at 691-
95; Espiell, supra note 35, at 708. 
141 Eide, supra note 137, at 694; Robertson, supra note 27, at 798-800. 
142 Accord Calogeropoulos-Stratis, supra note 33, at 661-62. 
143 Robertson, supra note 27, at 798-800. 
144 Calogeropoulos-Stratis, supra note 33, at 660. 
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factor makes it advantageous that both apply simultaneously. The two comple-
ment each other. 145 
The occupation law mechanism has possibilities that the human rights mech-
anism lacks. Since the former works on a confidential basis, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross can often gain access to information unobtainable 
by bodies operating on the basis of publicity of their information. On the other 
hand, the publicity cast on violations by the human rights mechanism can, at 
times, secure compliance where confidential representations do not. "[I]n hu-
manitarian law the consent of the state in question is required, while in human 
rights law no state can stop the procedure."146 Alleged Turkish violations in 
Cyprus in 1974, the subject of the European Commission proceedings recounted 
above, are cited as a situation in which a public human rights procedure was 
needed because a state refused to cooperate in application of humanitarian law: 
"[T]he Turkish government refused the application de jure of humanitarian law; 
however, it could not stop the application of the European Convention of 
Human Rights."147 
XIII. CONCLUSION 
A state in belligerent occupation is obliged to adhere to the norms of human 
rights law. An occupied population is in need of freedom of assembly and 
expression no less than any other population. An occupant may limit assembly 
and expression only on the bases permitted under human rights law. 
145 [d. at 661. 
146 [d. at 659. 
147 [d. at 657. 
